

# Arbitrary Prices in Generalized Bertrand Competition

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**Problem:** Consider a Generalized Bertrand Competition game. There are  $N$  firms indexed by  $i$ , each with cost  $c_i$ . They simultaneously announce prices  $p_i$  and realize demand  $q_i(p_i, p_{-i})$ , which is a function both of their own price, and other firms' prices. Their profits are

$$\pi_i(p_i, p_{-i}) = q_i(p_i, p_{-i})(p_i - c_i)$$

Construct demand functions  $q_i$  such that it is a Nash Equilibrium for each firm to announce the same price  $p_i = p$  **for any price**  $p > c_i \forall i$ .

The demand functions should satisfy the Law of Demand:

$$\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} < 0$$

And the firms' products should be substitutes:

$$\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_{-i}} > 0$$

**Solution:** Take the first-order condition with respect to  $p_i$ :

$$\frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial p_i} = q_i + \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i}(p_i - c_i) = 0$$

We seek an equilibrium where all firms set the same price. So we will conjecture that this equation will be solved by  $p_i = p$  when all other prices  $p_j = p \forall j \neq i$ . To do this, conjecture that the optimal  $p_i$  is some function of  $p_{-i}$  such that the function evaluates to  $p$  if all arguments (the other prices) are  $p$ . Many functions will work here, but the most natural is simply the average function:

$$p_i = \bar{p}_{-i} \equiv \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i} p_j$$

Substitute this into the F.O.C.:

$$0 = q_i + \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} (\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i)$$

$$\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} = -\frac{q_i}{(\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i)}$$

This is a first-order O.D.E. with a simple solution

$$q_i(p_i, p_{-i}) = \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right)$$

This is the solution to the problem. The remaining work is simply to formally validate what may seem obvious by inspecting the equation.

The function is maximized, not minimized, at  $\bar{p}_{-i}$ , as it is continuous and fulfills the Second-Order Condition:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 \pi_i}{\partial p_i^2} &= \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} + \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} + \frac{\partial^2 q_i}{\partial p_i^2} (p_i - c_i) \\ &= -\frac{2}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i} \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right) + \left(\frac{1}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right)^2 \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right) (p_i - c_i) \\ &= \left((p_i - c_i) \left(\frac{1}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right)^2 - \frac{2}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right) \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right) \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{p_i - c_i} - \frac{2}{p_i - c_i}\right) \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{p_i - c_i}\right) \\ &= -\frac{1}{p_i - c_i} \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{p_i - c_i}\right) < 0 \end{aligned}$$

For the fourth line above, recall that  $\bar{p}_{-i} = p_i$ .

It satisfies the Law of Demand:

$$\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} = -\frac{1}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i} \exp\left(-\frac{p_i}{\bar{p}_{-i} - c_i}\right) < 0$$

And the products are substitutes:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_{j \neq i}} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial p_j} \exp \left( -\frac{p_i}{\frac{1}{N-1}p_j + \frac{N-2}{N-1}p_i - c_i} \right) \\
&= -\exp \left( -\frac{p_i}{\frac{1}{N-1}p_j + \frac{N-2}{N-1}p_i - c_i} \right) \frac{\partial}{\partial p_j} \left( \frac{p_i}{\frac{1}{N-1}p_j + \frac{N-2}{N-1}p_i - c_i} \right) \\
&= -\exp \left( -\frac{p_i}{\frac{1}{N-1}p_j + \frac{N-2}{N-1}p_i - c_i} \right) \left( \frac{-\frac{1}{N-1}p_i}{\left( \frac{1}{N-1}p_j + \frac{N-2}{N-1}p_i - c_i \right)^2} \right) \\
&= (N-1) \frac{p_i}{(\bar{p}_i - c_i)^2} \exp \left( -\frac{p_i}{\bar{p}_i - c_i} \right) > 0
\end{aligned}$$

Q.E.D.